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Abstract 
 
 The capital structure theory has been under research since the original work of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958). Since then,  new theories have emerged trying to explain how 
companies define their capital structure, and a vast empirical research was done. 
 However, we consider that past empirical studies suffer from a problem of “historical 
influence” because the decisions a company made in the past can influence the actual capital 
structure decisions. To control for this problem, we use a sample of companies involved in 
a spin-off because after that operation, a new and independent company is created, and its 
capital structure needs to be defined, therefore this scenario allows for a more clear 
interpretation. 
 That sample comprises 73 parent companies and 73 spun-off companies, from 
several countries, spanning from 2009 to 2017. Our methodology relies on panel data, with 
fixed effects model estimation. 
 We find that for the subsample of parent companies before the spin-off, the results 
are not supported by the capital structure theories. But, when analyzing the subsample of 
spun-off companies all the variables, except NDTS, have their relationship with leverage 
supported by the capital structure theories and empirical studies. In these results, we can also 
see a supremacy of the pecking order theory in explaining the capital structure choices. When 
analyzing the subsample of parent companies after the spin-off we also find all the 
coefficients signs being in the accordance with the expected. 
 Therefore, we find that before the spin-off managers don’t follow any theoretical 
reasonings to support their capital structure decisions, but after the spin-off they do. 
Especially, the pecking order theory seems to better explain these decisions. Size and Asset 
Tangibility seem to produce a positive effect on leverage, while Growth Opportunities and 
Profitability have a negative relationship with leverage. 
 
Key-words: Capital  Structure,  Pecking  Order  Theory,  Trade-off  Theory,  Spin-Off. 
JEL-Codes: G30, G32, C33  
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Resumo 
 
 A teoria da estrutura de capitais tem sido um tema bastante investigado após o 
trabalho de Modigliani and Miller (1958). Desde aí, surgiram novas teorias e um vasto 
número de estudos empíricos.  
 Contudo, nós consideramos que estes estudos empíricos até agora realizados sofrem 
de um problema de “influência histórica”, porque as decisões que uma empresa tomou no 
passado podem condicionar as decisões atuais acerca da definição da estrutura de capitais. 
Para mitigar este problema, utilizamos uma amostra de empresas envolvidas num spin-off 
porque após essa operação, uma nova e independente empresa é criada, para a qual tem de 
ser definida uma estrutura de capitais. Isto permite-nos uma interpretação mais realista e 
fiável. 
 A amostra utilizada é composta por 73 empresas-mãe e 73 empresas spun-off, de vários 
países, num período de 2009 a 2017. A metodologia baseia-se na estimação de um modelo 
de efeitos fixos, utilizando dados em painel.  
 Concluímos que os resultados para a amostra de empresas-mãe antes do spin-off não 
são suportados pela teoria da estrutura de capitais. Mas, quando analisamos a amostra de 
empresas spun-off, todas as variáveis exceto NDTS têm a sua relação com o endividamento 
suportada pelas teorias e pelos estudos empíricos já realizados. Nestes resultados podemos 
também ver uma supremacia da teoria da Pecking Order em explicar as decisões da estrutura 
de capitais. Quando analisada a amostra de empresas-mãe após spin-off, também podemos 
concluir que os resultados são de acordo com o esperado pela teoria. 
 Portanto, os resultados deste estudo mostram que antes do spin-off os gestores não 
parecem seguir a teoria para definir a estrutura de capitais, mas nas amostras das empresas 
após o spin-off acontece o oposto. Os determinantes Dimensão e Tangibilidade dos Ativos 
parecem estar positivamente relacionados com o endividamento, enquanto que as 
Oportunidades de Crescimento e a Rendibilidade têm a relação oposta. 
 
Palavras-chave: Estrutura de Capitais, Teoria da Pecking Order, Teoria do Trade-off, Spin-Off. 
Classificação JEL: G30, G32, C33  
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1. Introduction 
 In finance, capital structure is a concept that defines the proportion of the two main 
capital sources – debt and equity – that a corporation uses to finance its total assets. The 
decision about the proportion of debt and equity to be used to finance a company plays a 
very important role in the financial decisions of a firm. Choosing the right proportion helps 
to minimize the WACC, to increase the firm’s value and can also affect the firm’s profitability 
and its risk because defining wrongly the company’s capital structure may cause financial 
distress, or even bankruptcy, if the company fails to cover the debt obligations. That’s why 
it is so important for managers to understand the theory of capital structure and the main 
determinants that influence its formation. 
 This theory was initially coined by Modigliani and Miller (1958) and it has inspired 
many researchers to further examine and develop it. Since then, some of the original 
assumptions were gradually relaxed by other authors, and new theories were developed trying 
to explain how companies define their capital structure. That was the case of trade-off and 
pecking order theories, two of the most relevant modern theories. 
 Based on these theories and in other related empirical studies, we identify five 
determinants of capital structure that have been proved to be the most relevant ones. They 
are the size, growth opportunities, profitability, asset tangibility, and non-debt tax shield. 
However, the effect of these firm characteristics on leverage is not consensual between the 
capital structure theories. In the case of some determinants, they posit conflicting predictions 
regarding their relation with leverage. So, there is still the need to further examine the validity 
of theoretical determinants and conclude about which theory best describes the managers’ 
choices on capital structure. And that is what we propose to do. 
 However, we pretend to do it differently from what has been done in prior studies. 
In our opinion, these prior studies suffer from a problem of “historical influence”. That is, 
the operating and financial decisions a company made in the past have influence in the 
decisions that must be made in the present and, because of that, the relationship between 
firm characteristics and leverage is not that easily detectable. Therefore, to control for this 
problem, we use a sample of companies involved in a spin-off since, after that operation, a 
new and independent company is created (with a new board of directors and traded 
separately from the parent company). For that reason, this sample provides a very special 
opportunity to study the conscious managers’ decisions about capital structure formation in 
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the newly created company (the spun-off company), controlling for the majority of the 
effects of historical decisions.  
 Our sample is comprised of 73 parent companies and 73 spun-off companies, from 
several countries, spanning from 2009 to 2017, with data organized in panel. We will analyze 
these subsamples separately, doing a regression in the parent companies before and after the 
spin-off, and another one in the sample of spun-off companies. By this way, we can study 
the capital structure formation separately in the two set of companies, that are in different 
life-cycle stages, compare the results and conclude about the influence of past decisions on 
the actual capital structure’s choice. 
 To do this study, we recur to a multiple linear regression model, controlling for time 
effects with year dummies and for heteroscedasticity using standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity.  
 Therefore, our objective is to add a new and “clean” analysis to the existent literature 
about capital structure, studying the determinants that most influence the capital structure 
choices in companies that were newly created - the spun-off companies. Additionally, we 
intend to conclude whether there are relevant differences between the way parent companies 
before the spin-off (in the presence of historical decisions’ effect) and the newly created 
spun-off companies define their capital structure. Lastly, we add some conclusions about 
which of the main capital structure theories – the trade-off and pecking order – best describes 
the capital structure formation. 
 Apart from the introduction, the work assumes the following structure: in chapter 2, 
there is a review of  the main  literature  references  on  this  topic  and  the  theories  
underlying  to the determinants of company’s capital structure; in chapter 3 it is defined the 
research hypotheses to be tested in this study; in chapter 4, we present the model and 
methodology to be used, the sample, the definition of the variables of the model and the 
main descriptive statistics. The empirical results for all the subsample regression analysis are 
presented in chapter 5; and finally, in chapter 6 it is made a summary of the conclusions of 
this work and the suggestions for future research.  
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2. Literature Review 
The theme of capital structure was originally boosted by Modigliani and Miller, in 
1958, originating since then a vast literature with relevant empirical and theoretical 
developments. These authors demonstrated that, under some specific assumptions (that will 
be presented later), the capital structure is irrelevant and does not affect the firm's value. 
However, as these assumptions were gradually relaxed, new theories were developed 
trying to explain how companies define their capital structure. That was the case of trade-off 
and pecking order theories, that assume the capital structure as a relevant factor for the firm's 
value. 
In this chapter, we intend to do a theoretical review of the above capital structure 
theories and realize how can they be helpful to understand the companies' financing 
decisions. In a first place, the Modigliani and Miller model and its assumptions will be 
presented, followed by the trade-off theory and, lastly, the pecking order theory. 
 
2.1. Main Theories of Capital Structure 
2.1.1. Modigliani and Miller model 
Also called “M&M theorem”, it was a milestone from which several related theories 
were developed. Their work states that, in a perfect market context, the value of a firm is not 
affected by its capital structure. This perfect market context means: the absence of market 
frictions (no bankruptcy costs, no agency costs, no transaction costs and no tax), the absence 
of arbitrage opportunities, the absence of asymmetric information and homogeneous 
expectations from investors relative to the company’s future profitability. Considering all 
these assumptions, the authors formulated two important propositions: 
Proposition I: 
This proposition states that, in a perfect market, the market value of a company is 
independent of its capital structure. That is, the proportion of debt and equity chosen by the 
company does not impact its value. Instead, the authors argue the company's market value 
derives from the discounted future cash flows. Therefore, according to this proposition, the 
market value of a company is a function of its capacity to generate future cash flows and of 
its investment policy. 
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Proposition II: 
In their second proposition, the authors propose that the higher the debt-to-equity 
ratio, the higher will be the required rate of return on equity - because the equity holders will 
face a higher risk in a company highly financed by debt. Therefore, they consider that the 
value of a levered company equals the value of an unlevered company plus a risk premium. 
In 1963, Modigliani and Miller reformulated the model, recognizing the financial 
benefit from tax-deductible expenses (as the interest payments). They conclude that the 
company's value will increase as its level of debt increases. However, the authors emphasize 
that it doesn’t mean firms should be entirely financed by debt, because cheaper alternatives 
of financing can be available, like the retained earnings, and because some lenders restrict 
the amount they lend to a given company. 
Nevertheless, by the fact that this theory just holds under a context of perfect market, 
it was challenged in several subsequent studies. In these studies, the assumptions of 
Modigliani and Miller’s study were seen as unrealistic and then successively eliminated, 
yielding different theoretical perspectives regarding capital structure determinants, proving 
that in fact capital structure has an impact on the firm’s value. The two main theories resulting 
from this, were the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory, that we address with more 
detail in the next pages. 
 
2.1.2. Trade-off Theory 
In this theory, originally developed by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), the M&M’s 
assumptions for corporate taxes and bankruptcy costs are relaxed. The trade-off theory, as 
mentioned by Myers (1984), suggests that firm’s value increases with leverage because the 
interests are tax deductible, providing a tax shield; but that increase is offset by a negative 
effect of debt - the bankruptcy costs. So, increasing the level of debt brings benefits because 
of the tax shield but also increase the probability of financial distress, therefore managers 
need to trade-off between these two consequences. According to this theory, a firm can 
maximize its value when it chooses a capital structure that optimizes the relationship between 
the benefits of the tax shield and the costs of bankruptcy. 
Analytically, this can be represented as follows: 
Firm’s Value = Equity Value + PV (Tax Shield) - PV (Costs of Financial Distress) 
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After the first work of Myers, in 1984, additional studies were made by several 
authors to test this trade-off theory. Sheik and Wang (2010) stated that the Trade-Off theory 
chooses the capital structure that maximizes the value of the company by minimizing the 
costs of prevailing market imperfections. According to Chen (2010), companies that have 
access to more tax advantages will issue more debt to finance business operation and the 
cost of financial distress and benefit from tax shield are balanced. Ebaid (2009) also provide 
empirical evidence supporting the trade-off theory and the positive relationship between 
capital structure and firm performance. 
In sum, this theory indicates the existence of an optimal debt-to-equity ratio that 
maximizes the firm’s value.  
 
2.1.3. Pecking Order Theory 
The theory of pecking order was developed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
emphasizes the role of asymmetric information in the firm’s operation. Contrarily to the 
trade-off theory, this theory does not admit the existence of an optimal capital structure or 
an optimal level of debt, but that companies follow a hierarchical order of preference by 
types of financing. The pecking order states that internal resources (like retained earnings) 
are preferred to the external ones (with debt being preferred over equity). 
Since the outside investors/market doesn’t have all the information, Ebaid (2009) 
suggests they may undervalue the firm’s new shares relative to the intrinsic value measured 
by managers (who understand the whole picture of the firm’s operation). Hence, issuing 
more equity will likely hurt the current value of the existing firm’s stocks, due to the transfer 
of value between the new and old stockholders. Therefore, when capitalizing, managers will 
avoid equity capital and select firstly internal sources. If internal financing is not enough, the 
firm will issue debt - with short-term debt being the first choice because does not require 
collateral, and then long-term debt. As a last resort, it comes the equity. Additionally, 
Hamilton and Fox (1998) found that managers are not very receptive to the issue of equity 
since it means the entrance of new shareholders and managers don’t like to lose their control 
over companies. So, to finance their projects they try to use internal earnings as a first option. 
Based on the asymmetric information, the pecking order theory implies that firms 
only issue new shares at overprice relative to the current stock price. Thus, issuing new shares 
signals that the equity may be overpriced and, more importantly, that the firm is not 
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confident enough to be financed by debt. Contrarily, Myers (1984) argue that if a firm is 
willing to use debt capital, it signals a healthy and confident position about the future.  
Additionally, as profitable firms generate higher retained earnings, the more 
profitable a firm is the less debt it needs to use. Rajan and Zingales (1995) approved this 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage, indicating that profitable firms use 
more retain earnings and certainly, less debt. Some other studies also concluded results that 
underpin the pecking order theory, as it’s the case of Friend and Lang (1988), Titman and 
Wessels (1988) and Kester (1986). However, some other studies also found contradictions 
about this theory, like Fama and French (2005) that suggest financial decisions usually don’t 
follow the predicted by the pecking order theory. 
In sum, pecking order theory suggests that asymmetric information affects the firm’s 
choice in capital financing and that firms follow a hierarchy of financing decisions (where 
internal sources of financing are preferred to the external ones). Moreover, it suggests a 
negative relation between profitability and leverage. 
 
2.2. Similar empirical studies 
There are several empirical studies that have already studied the determinants of 
capital structure. But, our study differs from these by the fact we use a sample of spin-offs 
to analyze the most relevant determinants to define a company’s capital structure. 
Nevertheless, we based ourselves on these past studies as a start point to select the variables 
we will study and how we will measure them, to define the expected relationship of these 
variables with the leverage, and consequently design our research hypotheses. 
In the following table, we sum up the conclusions we retrieved from the most 
important empirical studies, concerning the determinants of capital structure and their 
relationship with the leverage ratio of the company. We conclude that the most relevant 
determinants of capital structure’s choice, confirmed in past studies, are the size, growth 
opportunities, profitability, asset tangibility and non-debt tax shield.  
In table 1 we can see the relationship of these selected determinants of capital 
structure with the leverage ratio, found on the most relevant empirical studies. It is possible 
to conclude that size and asset tangibility are positively related with leverage in the majority 
of these studies. By contrary, growth opportunities, profitability and non-debt tax shield were 
found to have a negative relationship with leverage in most of the mentioned studies. 
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Table 1 - Empirical studies on determinants of capital structure 
This table summarizes the results from relevant empirical studies about the determinants of capital structure. “Positive” 
means the respective determinant of capital structure has a positive relationship with leverage, that is, they follow in the 
same direction. “Negative” means the determinant of capital structure has a negative relationship with leverage, that is, 
they follow in opposite direction. 
Determinants/ 
Authors 
 
Titman and 
Wessels 
(1988) 
Rajan and 
Zingales 
(1995) 
Wald 
(1999) 
Chen and 
Strange 
(2005) 
Frank and 
Goyal 
(2007a) 
Chang et al. 
(2009) 
Size Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
Growth Opportunities --- Negative Negative Positive Negative Negative 
Profitability Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
Asset Tangibility --- Positive Positive Positive Positive Negative 
Non-Debt Tax Shield --- ---- Negative ---- Negative Negative 
Sample Characteristics 
469 USA 
companies 
(1974 – 1982) 
4557 
companies 
G7 countries 
(1987-1991) 
4404 
companies 
from 5 
countries 
(1991-1992) 
972 Chinese 
companies 
(2003) 
USA 
companies 
(1950-2003) 
Companies 
from several 
countries 
(1988-2003) 
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3. Research Hypotheses 
In this chapter, we intend to introduce the research hypotheses that will be 
empirically tested further in this study. To formulate the hypotheses, firstly we identify from 
past studies which variables are most relevant when choosing the company’s capital structure 
– that information was already revised in table 1, from the previous chapter. Secondly, based 
on the previously reviewed capital structure theories and based on the results obtained from 
similar empirical studies, we establish a prediction of the impact of these variables on the 
level of leverage of the companies in our sample. 
As we mentioned before, based on the past literature, we identify as the most relevant 
and consistent determinants of capital structure: the size, growth opportunities, profitability, 
asset tangibility and non-debt tax shield. Then we will detail each one of these variables, 
including the supporting literature, and formulate the respective research hypotheses. 
 
3.1.  Size 
The majority of the studies suggest size as an important determinant of a company’s 
capital structure. Larger companies tend to be more diversified, have more stable cash-flows 
and, hence, they face lower bankruptcy costs because the probability of failure is smaller. 
Therefore, larger companies can access external financing at a lower cost. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), Titman and Wessels (1988) and Wald (1999) found a 
positive relationship between a company’s size and leverage, whereby the larger the company 
the bigger the tendency to get financed by debt.  
Additionally, Ferri and Jones (1979) and Frank and Goyal (2007) also found similar 
conclusions concerning the positive relationship between leverage and firm size. 
Therefore, based on the above studies, we formulate the first research hypotheses, as 
follows: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. 
 
3.2.  Growth Opportunities 
Myers (1977) suggests that companies with more growth opportunities tend to have 
access to more profitable investment opportunities, being more profitable companies and 
hence less levered. Additionally, the high growth whose value comes from intangible growth 
opportunities could also represent higher earnings volatility relative to the future, and so, that 
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growth firms do not want to commit themselves to debt servicing as their revenue may not 
be available when needed. Therefore, the author suggests a negative relationship between 
growth opportunities and leverage. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Harris and 
Raviv (1991), Stulz (1990), Wald (1999), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Kim and Sorensen 
(1986) also reach similar conclusions regarding the negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage. 
The trade-off theory is also in line with a negative relationship between growth and 
leverage. It considers that growth opportunities are particular cases of intangible assets that 
add value to a firm but cannot be used as a collateral, which represent more difficulties in 
raising debt in favorable terms (because, in the case of bankruptcy, the value of the growth 
opportunities will be close to zero), reducing thereby the use of leverage by growth 
companies. The empirical evidence from similar studies, as we mentioned above, is 
consistent with the trade-off theory. 
Therefore, according to the majority of the past empirical studies, and with the trade-
off theory, we formulate the second hypotheses to be tested, as follows: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. 
 
3.3.  Profitability 
Profitability is a well-recognized determinant of capital structure and analyzed under 
different theories. From the point of view of the trade-off theory, high profitability reduces 
the probability of financial distress and induces firms to increase debt levels to exploit the 
tax deductibility of interest paid on debt. Hence, trade-off theory posits that there exists a 
positive relationship between profitability and leverage. 
On the other hand, the pecking order theory suggests a negative relationship between 
profitability and leverage. This theory proposes that retained earnings take the first place in 
the hierarchy of financing sources, and so the more profitable a firm is, the more retained 
earnings it should have, and so the need to issue debt diminishes. In practice, firms with high 
and stable profitability (for instance, Microsoft, Google or Intel) tend to have low debt 
leverage. 
Nevertheless, the empirical findings seem to confirm the negative relationship 
between profitability and debt. Titman and Wessels (1988) found that relationship to be 
negative and the results consistent with the pecking order theory, for a US sample. Kester 
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(1986) found similar results for Japanese firms. Rajan and Zingales (1995) found that 
profitability is negatively correlated in all countries of their sample except Germany.  
In sum, according to the past literature, although the results are still controversial, 
there is a strong empirical evidence on the negative association between profitability and 
leverage. Therefore, we define the third hypotheses to be tested, as follows: 
H3: There is a negative relationship between profitability and leverage. 
 
3.4.  Asset Tangibility 
Tangibility refers to the level of fixed assets over firm’s total assets. The tangible 
assets of the company are considered one of the main guarantees of repayment for the 
creditors, since this type of assets can be used as a collateral, particularly in case of 
bankruptcy. Furthermore, fixed assets increase tax deductions for depreciation. Thus, the 
more fixed assets, the more non-debt tax shield.  
So, as Gaud et al. (2005) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) concluded, the more tangible 
assets a firm has, the easier is to issue debt and less information about future profits is needed 
to be revealed. Additionally, Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Myers (1977) suggest that, 
according to the agency theory, firms with high leverage tend to invest sub-optimally, 
transferring wealth away from debtholders to equity holders. These cause lenders to require 
collateral because, as the authors suggested, the use of secured debt can help alleviate this 
problem. So, using secure debt provides a higher probability of recovering their debt 
payments which leads to lower agency costs and lower expected costs of distress (consistent 
with the trade-off theory). As mentioned by Scott (1977), firms unable to provide collaterals 
will have to pay higher interest or will be forced to issue equity instead of debt. Frank and 
Goyal  (2007) and Wald (1999) also found that companies with more tangible assets tend to 
be more levered. 
Therefore, according to all the studies presented, a positive relation between 
tangibility and leverage is predicted.  
On the other hand, the pecking order theory predicts that firms holding more 
tangible assets are more easily evaluated by investors and they are expected to be less prone 
to asymmetric information problems, and thus less likely to issue debt. This argument 
suggests a negative relationship between asset tangibility and leverage. 
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As we showed before, the vast majority of the empirical literature suggests a positive 
relationship between asset tangibility and leverage. Therefore, we define the fourth 
hypotheses to be tested, as follows: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between asset tangibility and leverage. 
 
3.5.  Non-Debt Tax Shield 
 Non-debt tax shield can be defined as the other items apart from interest expenses 
that also contribute to a decrease in tax payments. Examples of that can be depreciation, 
investment tax credits, corporate taxes and personal taxes. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) 
argue that these non-debt tax deductions can serve as substitutes for the tax benefits of debt 
financing. As a result, firms with large non-debt tax shields can choose to use less debt to 
limit its negative effects.  
 Kim and Sorensen (1986) also support that depreciation is an effective tax shield, and 
thus offsets the tax shield benefits of leverage. Frank e Goyal (2007) and Wald (1999) reach 
similar conclusions. 
 Therefore, if non-debt tax shields are substitutes for a debt-related tax shield, the 
relation between non-debt tax shields and leverage should be negative. The trade-off theory 
supports this negative relationship. 
We define the fifth hypotheses to be tested, as follows: 
H5: There is a negative relationship between non-debt tax shield and leverage. 
We summarize the above research hypotheses in the table 2. 
 
Table 2 - Research Hypotheses 
This table summarizes the research hypotheses presented in this chapter. To formulate the hypotheses, 
firstly we identify from past studies which variables are the most relevant when choosing the company’s 
capital structure; secondly, based on the main capital structure theories and similar empirical studies, 
we establish a prediction of the impact of these variables on the leverage of the companies in our 
sample. 
H1 There is a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. 
H2 There is a negative relationship between growth opportunities and leverage. 
H3 There is a negative relationship between profitability and leverage 
H4 There is a positive relationship between asset tangibility and leverage. 
H5 There is a negative relationship between non-debt tax shield and leverage 
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4. Methodology and Sample 
We start this chapter by introducing the methodology we will rely on for pursuing 
this study, followed by the variables of the model and its measures. Lastly, we introduce our 
sample and data collection process, as well as the main descriptive statistics. 
 
4.1. Methodology 
To identify the determinants that most impact the capital structure choice in the 
companies of our sample, we will resort to the regression analysis. In this case, we rely on a 
Multiple Linear Regression Model, because it allows us to study the relationship between one 
dependent variable and a set of independent variables. The hypotheses under study are 
confirmed when the explanatory variable in question is statistically significant and its 
coefficient sign is in accordance with the theoretical formulation. 
Analytically, the model that will be used to do the regression can be expressed as 
follows: 
LEVi,t = β0 + β1 SIZEi,t + β2 GROWTHi,t + β3 PROFITi,t + β4 TANGi,t + β5 NDTSi,t + μ i,t              (1) 
 Where: 
- i refers to the firm (cross-sectional dimension) and t refers to the year (time series 
dimension); 
- LEVi,t denotes the leverage of company i in year t, and it is the dependent variable; 
- The remaining variables (Size, Growth Opportunities, Profitability, Asset Tangibility 
and Non-Debt Tax Shield) are the independent variable of the model; 
- β0 is the constant term and β1 to β6 are the regression coefficients of the explanatory 
variables.  
- μ i,t represents the error of the model, also designated as disturbance term. 
For this study, we rely on panel data since we intend to focus on both time series and 
cross-sectional effects, and because it can give better results with small data samples (which 
is our case), as the cross observations collected during a period are combined, and so the 
number of observations increases (Sun and Parikh, 2001). Additionally, as referred by Hsiao 
et al. (2006), it allows for a more accurate inference of model parameters since panel data 
usually contain more degrees of freedom and more sample variability, hence improving the 
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efficiency of econometric estimates; and it can better find effects that are not observable in 
cross sections or time series data, resulting in a generally more robust and capable method. 
In the literature, the most used methods to estimate regressions with panel data are 
the fixed effects and the random effects models. In our study, to know which one is the most 
suitable for our sample, we run the Hausman test – where under the null hypotheses random 
effects is preferred and under the alternative hypothesis the fixed effects model is more 
appropriated and then preferred. We perform this test at the beginning of each regression 
analysis we do and choose the appropriate model for each one.  
We include year dummy variables for each year of the regression, in order to control 
for variables that are constant across firms but evolve over time and to capture the influence 
of aggregate time-series. Using year dummies gives as a warranty that the effects are not being 
driven by a specific year. These year dummies were included in all the regressions of our 
study. 
We intended to add some more dummy variables to control for other effects and 
perform other analysis, but due to the reduced size of our sample, it is not practicable. 
Additionally, to control for the impact of heteroscedasticity, we estimate panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSE) robust to heteroscedasticity. This is important because 
heteroscedasticity tends to produce p-values that are smaller than they should be, and so we 
could be concluding that a model term is statistically significant when it is not, which leads 
to bias in test statistics. 
 
4.2.  Variables Definition 
 In this section, we intend to define the variables that will be considered in the analysis, 
and how they will be measured, in order to test the previously defined hypotheses. Firstly, 
the dependent variable will be the leverage, since we intend to study the relationship 
between the determinants of the capital structure and the level of leverage chosen by the 
companies of our sample. To measure that variable, we rely on relevant past studies 
(specifically, Bradley et al., 1984; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Padron et al., 2005) and use the 
following proxy: 
Leverage (LEV) = Total Debt / Total Debt + Market Capitalization 
 14 
 The independent variables represent the determinants of capital structure that we 
have selected before, according to the existing literature. They will be measured as follows: 
 
4.2.1. Size 
In the literature, it has been used three different indicators to represent the firm size: 
the logarithm of sales (Gaud et al, 2005; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; and Titman and Wessels, 
1988), the logarithm of enterprise value (García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2010), and the 
logarithm of total assets (Padron et al, 2005; Frank and Goyal, 2007). In this study, we select 
the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for the company’s size. 
 
4.2.2. Growth 
Typically, in the literature, the Market-to-Book ratio is the most frequently used 
indicator to measure growth opportunities (for instance, the studies of Rajan and Zingales, 
1995; and Chang et al., 2009). Alternatively, the capital expenditures (CAPEX) over Total 
Assets or the ratio of R&D over Total Assets are also used by some authors, especially in 
studies with samples containing private firms where it is not possible to get the Market-to-
Book ratios. Some other studies have also used asset growth to measure growth 
opportunities, which is calculated by the percentage of growth in sales (subtracting previous 
year assets from that of the current year and dividing the result by previous year assets). 
However, in this study, we will use the Market-to-Book ratio to measure this variable. 
 
4.2.3. Profitability 
According to past studies, some different proxies were used to measure profitability, 
such as the ratio of Operating Income (EBIT) over Sales (or over Total Assets) used by 
Titman and Wessels in 1988, Wald in 1999, and Chen and Strange in 2005; and the Return 
on Assets ratio (used in Karadeniz et al., 2009). In this study, we use the ratio of EBIT over 
sales as an indicator of profitability. 
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4.2.4. Asset tangibility 
Measures of asset tangibility proposed in past literature include the ratio of Fixed 
Assets plus Inventories over Total Assets, as used by Chen (2004) and Gaud et al. (2005). 
That is the measure we will use. 
 
4.2.5. Non-debt tax shield 
 The majority of the studies concerning the determinants of capital structure have 
been measuring this variable with the ratio of Depreciation divided by Total Assets. This is 
also the proxy we use to measure this variable. 
To summarize the above information, we organize in table 3 the proxies that will be 
used to measure the variables of our model. 
 
Table 3 - Variables Definition 
This table presents the variables used in the model and how we measure them. Leverage is the dependent 
variable, while Size, Growth Opportunities, Profitability, Asset Tangibility and Non-Debt Tax Shield are 
the independent variables. 
Type Variable Proxy to measure the variable 
Dependent Leverage LEV = Total Debt / Total Debt + Market Cap. 
Independent Size SIZE = Ln (Total Assets) 
Independent Growth Opportunities GROWTH= Market Cap / Book value 
Independent Profitability PROFIT = EBIT / Total Assets 
Independent Asset Tangibility TANG = BV of Fixed Assets + Inv. / Total Assets 
Independent Non-Debt Tax Shield NDTS = Depreciation / Total Assets 
 
 
4.3.  Sample, Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics 
 In order to build the sample for this study, we recurred to Zephyr database to get the 
spin-off deals, and to Eikon Datastream to get the financial data for companies involved in 
these spin-off deals. The sample is comprised of companies from several countries, spanning 
from 2009 to 2017. 
 After the data collection, we found a lot of missing data for some years and 
companies that Datastream was unable to retrieve. And because of the reduced size of the 
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sample (since there are not so many spin-off operations each year) we could not afford to 
simply eliminate from our sample these companies with missing data. Therefore, we search 
manually for that data on companies’ annual reports, for each missing year, and crossing all 
the information channels available to get the needed data.  
 Additionally, we have also removed companies that belong to the financial, insurance 
and utilities sector to avoid capital structures dictated by regulatory 
considerations/accounting rules, since in these situations the capital structure’s choices do 
not rely entirely on managers’ decisions. 
 After all, this resulted in a sample comprised of 146 companies, where 73 are parent 
companies and the other 73 are spun-off companies, corresponding to a total of 1215 firm-
year observations. 
 Due to the nature of this study and data, we divided the whole sample in two: one 
with the parent companies and another one with the spun-off companies. In this way, we 
can study the capital structure formation separately in the two set of companies, that are in 
different life-cycle stages, compare the results and also conclude about the influence of past 
decisions on the actual capital structure’s choice. 
 Lastly, it is also important to refer that, to minimize the influence of possible outliers 
in our data, we resort on the technique of Winsorization, limiting the extreme values. We did 
a 99% winsorization, which means all data below the 1st percentile was set (and not 
eliminated) to the 1st percentile, and all data above the 99th percentile was set to the 99th 
percentile. 
 In table 4 we can find the main descriptive statistics for both the parent companies 
before the spin-off and the spun-off companies sample. From this analysis, we also intend 
to start deriving some conclusions about the differences in companies’ capital structure 
before and after the spin-off.  
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Table 4 - Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in both the sample of parent 
companies before the spin-off and the sample of spun-off companies. All variables were retrieved 
from the Datastream database and are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. LEVERAGE 
(measured as Total Debt / Total Debt + Market Cap) is the dependent variable. SIZE (ln of Total 
Assets), GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES (market-to-book ratio), PROFITABILITY (EBIT / 
Total Assets), ASSET TANGIBILITY (BV of Fixed Assets + Inventories / Total Assets) and 
NDTS (Depreciation / Total Assets) are the independent variables. 
VARIABLES 
PARENT COMPANIES BEFORE SPIN-OFF  
MEAN MEDIAN MAXIMUM MINIMUM 
STD. 
DEV 
OBS 
Leverage 0.275 0.228 0.997 0.000 0.283 239 
Size 14.021 14.126 23.655 6.988 3.485 239 
Growth Opportunities 1.902 1.420 15.990 -19.560 2.517 239 
Profitability -0.060 0.050 0.677 -3.161 0.359 239 
Asset Tangibility 0.325 0.237 0.967 0.000 0.284 239 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 0.023 0.015 0.147 0.000 0.026 239 
 
VARIABLES 
SPUN-OFF COMPANIES  
MEAN MEDIAN MAXIMUM MINIMUM 
STD. 
DEV 
OBS 
Leverage 0.270 0.147 0.895 0.000 0.297 466 
Size 13.593 14.071 20.576 6.987 3.563 466 
Growth Opportunities 2.174 1.320 8.913 -0.850 2.238 466 
Profitability -0.072 0.026 0.790 -1.076 0.313 466 
Asset Tangibility 0.342 0.289 0.949 0.001 0.283 466 
Non-Debt Tax Shield 0.022 0.016 0.084 0.000 0.021 466 
 
 As we can see in table 4, the dependent variable (leverage) in both the parent 
companies before the spin-off and the spun-off companies has an average rounding 27%. 
These means that the companies of both samples have an average debt level of 27,5%, which 
can be considered a low level of leverage. So, about the dependent variable, there is not a 
significant difference between the before and the after the spin-off. 
 Regarding the independent variables, the volatility of the variables Growth 
Opportunities, Profitability and Non-Debt Tax shield on the parent companies’ sample is a 
little bit high since the standard deviation is higher than the mean of these variables. In the 
spun-off companies’ sample, the variables with high volatility are the Growth Opportunities 
and Profitability. 
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 It is also important to note that Asset Tangibility and Non-Debt Tax Shield present 
a minimum value of zero in both samples, which is consistent with the fact that there are no 
negative amounts of assets and depreciation, respectively. 
 Additionally, in both samples, we can verify a high difference between maximum and 
minimum on variables Size and Growth Opportunities, resulting in higher standard 
deviations. However, we should be in mind that companies in our sample are in different 
stages of their life cycle and with different dimensions, which derives the so different values 
on variables related to growth and size of the companies.  
 Lastly, we can verify that the minimum values of Growth Opportunities and 
Profitability are negative in both samples, and this is perfectly normal because that market-
to-book (the proxy used to measure growth opportunities) can be negative and the EBIT 
can also be negative (EBIT/Total Assets was the proxy used to measure profitability, then a 
negative EBIT will result in a negative profitability ratio). 
 In sum, we cannot see any significant difference in descriptive statistics between the 
two samples. In the next chapter, we will analyze the regressions’ results and derive deeper 
conclusions about the capital structure formation. 
 In order to know if correlation is present in our data, we analyze the Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients between the variables and the variation inflation factor (VIF), whose 
results are in Appendix A. Since the coefficients are very low, indicating a low correlation 
between the variables, and the VIFs are below 10 (Wooldridge, 2013) we don’t need to be 
concerned with multicollinearity problems in our regressions. 
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5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
 
In this chapter, we present and discuss the empirical results obtained. We analyze the 
regression results in the context of the capital structure theories earlier discussed and based 
on the expected results expressed in our research hypotheses. 
 As described before, we regress separately three subsamples: one with spun-off 
companies, another one with parent companies before the spin-off and the third one with 
parent companies after the spin-off. Additionally, each sample will be divided into another 
two subsamples according to their earnings volatility, with the aim of studying the impact of 
this variable on capital structure formation. 
 
5.1.  Sample of Parent Companies before the Spin-Off 
 Starting with the subsample of 73 parent companies in the years before the spin-off, 
we can find in table 5 the regression results when using Fixed Effects model, as the Hausman 
Test suggests (for 5% level of confidence we reject the null hypothesis, that says Random 
Effects is the appropriate model, and accept the alternative - Fixed Effects being the 
appropriate model). 
 Analyzing the regression results found in table 5 we can see that, except size, none 
of the variables have a result in accordance with the expected from the theories, showing an 
opposite relationship with leverage. However, just the Size and Growth Opportunities’ 
coefficients are statistically significant, at 10% and 5% respectively. Size has a positive 
coefficient, which means bigger companies tend to incur more debt, and Growth 
Opportunities show a negative coefficient, meaning the more growth opportunities a 
company has, the less debt it will incur, which goes against what is found in other studies. 
So, in this regression, we can only validate Hypothesis 1, since it posits a positive relationship 
between Size and Leverage, and that variable is positive and statistically significant at 10% in 
our model. 
 Therefore, we can conclude that managers of parent companies of our sample, in the 
periods before the spin-off, don’t follow a theoretical reasoning to make capital structure 
decisions. The capital structure theories, as well as the past empirical studies, don’t support 
the relationships between the determinants and leverage that we found in this sample’s 
regression. So, it seems the capital structure formation is a consequence of several past 
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decisions, and it is not influenced by these determinants, as the past research and theories 
showed.  
 Table 5 - Regressions Output: Sample of Parent companies before the Spin-Off 
This table summarizes the output of OLS estimation of panel data regressions for a sample comprised 
of Parent companies before the Spin-Off operation, during the period 2009 – 2015, using Fixed Effects 
model, as indicated by the Hausman Test. The dependent variable is LEVERAGE (measured as Total 
Debt / Total Debt + Market Cap). The independent variables are: SIZE (ln of Total Assets), 
GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES (market-to-book ratio), PROFITABILITY (EBIT / Total Assets), 
ASSET TANGIBILITY (BV of Fixed Assets + Inventories / Total Assets) and NDTS (Depreciation 
/ Total Assets). The three regressions include year dummy variables and standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity. Coefficient values are listed at the first row and t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** 
and * means the variable is statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Independent 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
Whole Sample 
“High Volatility”  
Subsample 
“Low Volatility”  
Subsample 
Size + 
0.018* 
(1.874) 
0.038***  
(4.934) 
-0.003  
(-0.436) 
Growth 
Opportunities 
- 
0.003**  
(2.093) 
0.003**  
(2.339) 
0.000 
(0.038) 
Profitability - 
0.056  
(1.352) 
0.011  
(0.249) 
-0.072**  
(-2.488) 
Asset Tangibility + 
-0.034  
(-0.490) 
-0.112*  
(-1.731) 
0.084*  
(1.831) 
NDTS - 
0.638  
(0.824) 
-0.779*  
(-1.739) 
1.640*  
(1.812) 
R-Squared  0.788 0.792 0.841 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.673 0.664 0.724 
F-Statistic  6.825*** 6.206*** 7.209*** 
Observations  239 122 117 
Companies  73 35 38 
Hausman Test  23.274**   
 
 Later, we will analyze the sample of spun-off companies – if we see results in 
accordance with the predicted by the capital structure theories and empirical studies, we 
would be able to conclude that, in fact, historical decisions have influence in the actual 
decisions of capital structure formation. 
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 Additionally, in order to study the influence of volatility in the capital structure 
formation, we divided each sample into two other subsamples: one with companies that have 
earnings volatility above the median value, that we call “high volatility” companies, and the 
other one comprised of companies with earnings volatility below the median value – that we 
call “low volatility” companies. It is intended to find out if there are some considerable 
differences between the two set of companies, and see if companies’ volatility impacts the 
results. 
 We can find the results on the same table 5 and see that the coefficients of the 
variables Asset Tangibility and Non-Debt Tax Shield become statistically significant in both 
high and low volatility sample, while in the whole sample they weren’t. Asset Tangibility 
variable has a positive relationship with leverage in the low volatility sample regression, which 
is the expected sign according to past studies and theories. The Non-Debt Tax Shield’s 
coefficient has a negative relationship with leverage in the high volatility sample regression, 
which is also in accordance with the expected sign. 
 Another interesting result is in the Profitability variable. Its coefficient gains statistical 
significance only in the low volatility sample and presents a negative relation with leverage, 
which corresponds to the expected relation. 
 Lastly, both Size and Growth Opportunities’ coefficients loses their statistical 
significance in the regression of low volatility sample. 
 
5.2.  Sample of Spun-off Companies 
 Focusing on the results of the subsample of 73 spun-off firms, spanning from 2009 
to 2017, we can find in table 6 the regression results when using Fixed Effects model, as the 
Hausman Test suggests. 
 Analyzing the R-Squared we can conclude about the explanatory capacity of the 
model. In this case, the R-Squared is 84,67% which means that this model can explain almost 
85% of the variation on the leverage level. Looking for the F-Statistic, we can also conclude 
the model is significant. 
 Examining the coefficients of the variables and starting with Profitability, its 
coefficient is statistically significant at 1% and has a negative relation with leverage, which is 
consistent with Hypothesis 3 presented before. This means that when a company’s 
profitability increases, its leverage level decreases, so more profitable firms will become less 
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levered over time – which seems to be in accordance with pecking order theory that says 
more profitable firms use more internal funds, instead of debt. These results are in line with 
the ones from Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Wald (1999) 
studies. 
 Table 6 - Regressions Output: Sample of Spun-off companies 
This table summarizes the output of OLS estimation of panel data regressions for a sample comprised of 
spun-off companies, during the period 2009 – 2017, using Fixed Effects model, as indicated by the Hausman 
Test. Additionally, it also contains the results for the regression of the first year after the spin-off, of each 
company. The dependent variable is LEVERAGE (measured as Total Debt / Total Debt + Market Cap). 
The independent variables are: SIZE (ln of Total Assets), GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES (market-to-book 
ratio), PROFITABILITY (EBIT / Total Assets), ASSET TANGIBILITY (BV of Fixed Assets + 
Inventories / Total Assets) and NDTS (Depreciation / Total Assets). The three regressions include year 
dummy variables and standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. Coefficient values are listed at the first 
row and t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * means the variable is statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
Independent 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
Whole 
Sample 
First year 
after Spin-Off 
“High Volatility”  
Subsample 
“Low Volatility”  
Subsample 
Size + 
0.009 
(0.730) 
0.017* 
(1.961) 
0.018** 
(2.242) 
-0.049 
(-1.345) 
Growth 
Opportunities 
- 
-0.025*** 
(-5.488) 
-0.041*** 
(-4.016) 
-0.015* 
(-1.899) 
-0.052*** 
(-5.711) 
Profitability - 
-0.134*** 
(-3.659) 
0.175* 
(1.954) 
-0.121** 
(-2.371) 
-0.623*** 
(-2.935) 
Asset Tangibility + 
0.128** 
(2.443) 
0.093 
(1.028) 
0.103* 
(1.954) 
0.287** 
(2.094) 
NDTS - 
1.305** 
(2.350) 
2.515*** 
(3.489) 
2.203** 
(2.055) 
-0.037 
(-0.052) 
R-Squared  0.847 0.443 0.657 0.887 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
 
0.812 0.401 0.569 0.855 
F-Statistic  24.334*** 10.645*** 7.469*** 27.407*** 
Observations  466 73 241 225 
Companies  73 73 36 37 
Hausman Test  24.118 **    
 
 Regarding Growth Opportunities, its coefficient is also statistically significant at 1% 
and negatively related to leverage, which is in line with Hypothesis 2. This result suggests 
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that companies with more growth opportunities tend to be less levered. This is in accordance 
with the results obtained by Rajan and Zingales (1995), Wald (1999) and Frank and Goyal 
(2007a), and supports the pecking order theory because it states that companies with more 
growth opportunities tend to be more profitable, assuming less debt. 
 In relation to Asset Tangibility, the results show that its coefficient is statistically 
significant at 5% and positively related to leverage, which is in conformity with the 
Hypothesis 4. This result indicates that the more tangible assets a company has, the more 
debt it is prone to assume. Titman and Wessels (1988) also got similar results and refer that 
tangible assets can be used as a collateral in debt loans, facilitating the company’s access to 
debt at more favorable terms. Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Wald (1999) found similar 
results. The positive relation between asset tangibility and leverage that our results show is 
supported by both trade-off and pecking order theories. 
 The coefficient of Non-Debt Tax Shield is also statistically significant at 5% and 
presents a positive relation with leverage, which means the more non-debt (for instance, 
depreciation, investment tax credits or corporate taxes) tax shield a company has, the more 
debt it assumes. However, this positive sign is contrary to the theoretical expectation, which 
doesn’t allow us to validate Hypothesis 5. Bradley et al (1984) also obtained this same 
conclusion, because they argue that firms that invest heavily on tangible assets and thus 
generate higher levels of depreciation and tax credits, tend to have higher levels of leverage 
since they need resources to finance these investments. Additionally, Graham (2005) presents 
similar conclusions. Nevertheless, despite being a statistically significant variable we have to 
reject the Hypothesis 5. 
 Lastly, the coefficient of the variable Size is the only one that is not statistically 
significant in this regression, and so we have to reject hypothesis 1. 
 So, in the regression results of this sample, we can see a supremacy of pecking order 
theory in explaining the capital structure choices, since Profitability, Growth Opportunities, 
and Asset Tangibility have their relationship with debt supported by pecking order theory, 
while there is just one variable in accordance with trade-off theory – which is Asset 
Tangibility, that in this case is supported by both theories. With these results, we validate 3 
of the 5 research hypotheses. 
 To reinforce the results of this analysis and to see even more clearly the managers 
decision on capital structure formation, in this sample we selected just the first year following 
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the spin-off and regress the model. The results are on the same table 6, and it is interesting 
to see they are very similar to the ones in the “whole sample”, which reinforces our previous 
results. The only changes are on the variable Asset Tangibility that lost statistical significance 
and on the variable Profitability that shows a different coefficient sign. 
 That being said, we can conclude that managers of the companies in our sample tend 
to define the spun-off’s capital structure following rational reasonings and theories. In the 
previous analysis for parent companies before the spin-off, we saw the results indicate that 
managers didn’t follow any theory when defining the company’s capital structure. But, when 
a new company is created in a spin-off, we see the relationship between the determinants of 
capital structure and the leverage is the one predicted by past empirical studies and main 
theories, with a supremacy of pecking order theory in explaining the managers’ decisions.  
 So, this can indicate that in fact the past decisions and past circumstances a company 
has in its historic can impact and influence the decisions that have to be made today, 
regarding the capital structure formation. This reinforces the relevance of our idea of testing 
these determinants in a more clear way, using a sample of spun-off companies recently 
created, in order to eliminate the majority of the historical influence in the capital structure 
decisions. Thus, we are able to see the direct managers’ influence and choices when defining 
a company’s capital structure. 
 Additionally, in order to study the influence of volatility in the capital structure 
formation, we divided each sample into two other subsamples: one with companies that have 
earnings volatility above the median value, that we call “high volatility” companies, and the 
other one comprised of companies with earnings volatility below the median value – that we 
call “low volatility” companies. It is intended to find out if there are some considerable 
differences between the two set of companies, and see if companies’ volatility impacts the 
results.  
 Starting with the “high volatility” companies, we can see, still in table 6, that all the 
variables’ coefficients are statistically significant and have all the same relation with debt (with 
different but very similar magnitudes) as the main sample presented before.  
 For the companies with lower volatility, Growth Opportunities, Profitability and 
Asset Tangibility keep the statistical significance, as well as their relationship with leverage. 
However, the variables Size and Non-Debt Tax Shield show opposite relationship with 
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leverage in relation to the “whole sample” and to the “high volatility” sample, and both are 
not statistically significant in this sample, while they were in the others. 
 Therefore, the level of volatility appears to provoke slight differences in the analysis, 
since on the spun-off companies with lower volatility, Size and Non-Debt Tax Shield seems 
to not be relevant determinants to explain the capital structure formation, when in the main 
spun-off companies’ sample they were. 
 
5.3.  Sample of Parent Companies after the Spin-Off 
 After analyzing the results for parent companies before the spin-off and for spun-off 
companies, we do this analysis also for the parent companies after the spin-off. With this, 
we intend to see if the spin-off operation caused some alterations on the way managers define 
the capital structure of the parent companies. 
 This subsample is comprised of 66 companies, with data spanning between 2009 and 
2017, which resulted in 440 observations. Consulting the regression results, present in table 
7, we can see that all independent variables are statistically significant except Asset 
Tangibility.  
 Size coefficient is statistically significant at 1% and presents a positive relation with 
leverage, which indicates that bigger companies tend to be more levered. This result is in line 
with the trade-off theory which argues that largest firms are more diversified and face lower 
default risk, which facilitates the access to debt. 
 Growth Opportunities’ coefficient is also significant at 1% and negatively related to 
leverage, so it means that when companies increase their growth opportunities, they tend to 
reduce the use of debt. This result is similar to the ones found on main capital structure 
studies, that we have presented before, and supports pecking order theory, as it states that 
companies with more growth opportunities tend to be more profitable, assuming less debt. 
 The coefficient associated to Profitability is statistically significant and negatively 
related to leverage, which means more profitable companies tend to use less debt. This is 
also in accordance with the expected relation and supported by the pecking order theory.  
 Non-Debt Tax Shield coefficient is significant at 1% and presents a negative 
relationship with leverage, which is in accordance with the expected and supported by the 
trade-off theory. 
 From these results, we can conclude that for the parent companies in the periods 
after the spin-off, we have not a leading theory that can explain the firms’ decisions about 
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their capital structure. The trade-off theory can explain the variables’ relationship with 
leverage for the variables Size and Non-Debt Tax Shield. The Pecking order theory can 
explain the same relationship for the variables Profitability and Growth Opportunities. 
  
 Table 7 - Regressions Output: Sample of Parent companies after the Spin-Off  
This table summarizes the output of OLS estimation of panel data regressions for a sample 
comprised of Parent companies after the Spin-Off operation, during the period 2009 – 2017, using 
Fixed Effects model, as indicated by the Hausman Test. The dependent variable is LEVERAGE 
(measured as Total Debt / Total Debt + Market Cap). The independent variables are: SIZE (ln of 
Total Assets), GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES (market-to-book ratio), PROFITABILITY (EBIT 
/ Total Assets), ASSET TANGIBILITY (BV of Fixed Assets + Inventories / Total Assets) and 
NDTS (Depreciation / Total Assets). The three regressions include year dummy variables and 
standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. Coefficient values are listed at the first row and t-
statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * means the variable is statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
Independent 
Variables 
Expected 
Sign 
Whole Sample 
“High Volatility”  
Subsample 
“Low Volatility”  
Subsample 
Size + 
0.039*** 
(1.874) 
0.031***  
(5.255) 
 0.045*** 
(10.747) 
Growth 
Opportunities 
- 
-0.014*** 
(2.093) 
-0.013*** 
(-2.795) 
-0.011*  
(-1.715) 
Profitability - 
-0.108*** 
(1.352) 
-0.067** 
(-2.537) 
-0.573***  
(-2.637) 
Asset Tangibility + 
0.016 
(-0.490) 
0.104*  
(1.954) 
-0.139**  
(-2.423) 
NDTS - 
-1.833*** 
(0.824) 
-0.913  
(-1.023) 
-3.079**  
(-2.195) 
R-Squared  0.852 0.831 0.867 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.819 0.784 0.832 
F-Statistic  26.180*** 17.861*** 25.257*** 
Observations  440 224 117 
Companies  66 35 38 
Hausman Test  27.488**   
 
 We can also conclude that after the spin-off, the regression’s results are much more 
consistent with the capital structure theories and with other empirical studies, than in the 
regression for the period before the spin-off. The results of the sample of parent companies 
before the spin-off shows that none of the variables except Size have their relationship with 
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leverage supported by capital structure theories. In this sample of parent companies after the 
spin-off, the results show that all the coefficient signs are in line with the ones predicted by 
the capital structure theories and past studies, and all the variables’ coefficients except Asset 
Tangibility being statistically significant.  
 It is interesting to see the so different results for the same companies, but for 
different periods separated by a spin-off event. As we saw in the previous analysis, before 
the spin-off the parent companies don’t have their capital structure formation justified by 
any theoretical reasoning. But, in this analysis with the same companies but for periods after 
the spin-off, we can see that all the capital structure determinants are in accordance with the 
predicted by the past literature and by the theories (although we can’t define a leading theory), 
which represents an abrupt change on the way managers define the company’s capital 
structure. 
 
 In the analysis of the volatility impact on capital structure formation, we can see that 
there are no big differences in the statistical significance and in the sign of the coefficients, 
as well as its magnitude. The exception is for the variable Asset Tangibility, that gains 
statistical significance when we analyze the subsamples individually and in the low volatility 
sample its sign is in accordance with the expected one; and for the variable Non-Debt Tax 
Shield that loses its statistical significance when analyzing only the high volatility sample. 
 Apart from these exceptions, volatility seems to not have a big impact in this sample 
of parent companies in the periods after the spin-off. 
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6. Conclusion 
 With the aim of analyzing the managers’ capital structure choices, we use a sample 
comprised of companies involved in a spin-off operation. This provides a very special 
opportunity to analyze the capital structure formation because in the spin-off a new 
independently company is created, with a new board of directors, and almost with a “blank 
page” of past decisions influencing the further decisions that must be made, especially the 
ones concerning the capital structure formation. 
 We collected data from Zephyr and Datastream, as well as from companies’ annual 
reports, to build a sample comprised of 73 parent companies and 73 spun-off companies, 
from several countries. The data is structured in panel, and we regress each sample 
independently. After performing a Hausman Test for each regression we found the fixed 
effects model to be the most appropriated.  
 Firstly, we analyzed the regression results of the parent companies’ sample, in the 
periods before the spin-off. The results indicate that, except Size, none of the variables shows 
a relationship with leverage in accordance with the expected from past empirical studies and 
theories. Size and Growth Opportunities’ coefficients were the only ones statistically 
significant at 10% and 5% respectively, with Size presenting a positive relationship with 
leverage and Growth Opportunities a negative one. But, as Size is the only one presenting 
an expected and statistically significant coefficient, we could only validate Hypothesis 1. 
From these results, we could conclude that managers of parent companies of our sample, in 
the periods before the spin-off, don’t make capital structure decisions supported by the main 
theories and past empirical studies. 
 Then, we proceeded with the analysis of the spun-off companies, in order to find if 
managers decide based on theoretical reasonings when the company is newly created and a 
capital structure has to be designed. From the results, we could see that only one variable 
(NDTS, which presents a positive relationship with leverage) doesn’t have its relationship 
with leverage supported by the capital structure theories and empirical studies. All the others 
have coefficients in accordance with the expected: Size and Asset Tangibility have a positive 
relationship with leverage, and Growth Opportunities and Profitability have a negative one. 
Additionally, these results also show a supremacy of the pecking order theory in explaining 
the capital structure choices. Therefore, when we analyze a sample with newly created 
companies, managers seem to follow the theory to decide about capital structure formation, 
which can indicate that the past decisions a company made can influence the capital structure 
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decisions that have to be made today. This reinforces the relevance of our idea of testing 
these determinants in a more clear way, using a sample of spun-off companies recently 
created, in order to eliminate the majority of the historical influence in the capital structure 
decisions.  
 As an addition to the prior analysis, we did the same analysis for parent companies 
but, this time, in the period after the spin-off. We intended to see if the spin-off provoked 
some alterations on the way managers define the capital structure for the parent companies. 
The results of this subsample show that there is not a leading theory to explain their capital 
structure formation, because two of them (Size and NDTS) are supported by the trade-off 
theory, and the other two (Profitability and Growth Opportunities) are supported by pecking 
order theory; however, all of them are in accordance with the expected results based on the 
most relevant past studies. Only the coefficient associated to Asset Tangibility was not 
statistically significant. With this analysis, it was interesting to note that after the spin-off the 
results are much more consistent with the theory than the results of the same companies but 
for a period before the spin-off, where the variables’ coefficients were the opposite of the 
expected. Therefore, the spin-off seems to provoke a shift in the way managers define the 
capital structure. 
 In sum, it is possible to conclude from this study that a spin-off provides a very 
special opportunity to study the managers’ conscious decisions about capital structure 
formation, since the results indicate that when considering companies with the influence and 
limitations of past decisions, the capital structure is not designed according to the established 
by the theory. But when we analyze a sample of spun-off companies, which are newly created 
companies with little to none past decisions influence, the results indicate that managers 
decisions are in accordance with the expected from past empirical studies, with the pecking 
order theory being the one that best describes the way managers choose the company’s 
capital structure. In both samples concerning the periods after the spin-off (the sample of 
spun-off companies and the sample of parent companies after the spin-off) Size and Asset 
Tangibility seem to produce a positive effect on leverage, while Growth Opportunities and 
Profitability have a negative relationship with leverage. The Non-Debt-Tax-Shield have a 
positive relationship in the sample of spun-off companies and a negative one in the sample 
of the parent companies after the spin-off. 
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6.1.  Limitations of this Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
 The biggest limitation of our study is clearly the reduced size of its sample. For that 
reason, it is important to mention that all the conclusions need to be taken carefully. 
 Naturally, the first suggestion for future research is to consider a more extent sample. 
Including more years in the time span of the sample would also be a good suggestion to 
increase the number of firm-year observations. 
 Additionally, after getting a bigger sample, it would be interesting to insert industry 
dummies in the model, since the type of industry can affect the company’s capital structure. 
In our study, as we have a sample of reduced size it was not practicable to introduce more 
dummy variables. 
 Finally, another suggestion for future research is to include the effect of taxes on the 
capital structure choices and analyze country-specific factors, because the capital structure 
can be influenced by other factors beyond firm-specific factors. 
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8. Appendices 
 
8.1. Appendix A – Multicollinearity Testing 
Table 8 - Pearson’s correlation coefficients - Sample of Spun-off companies  
VARIABLES Size 
Growth  
Opportunities 
Profitability 
Asset 
Tangibility 
NDTS Leverage 
Size 1.000      
Growth Opp. -0.002 1.0000     
Profitability 0.412 -0.048 1.0000    
Asset 
Tangibility 
-0.097 -0.024 -0.065 1.0000   
NDTS 0.138 0.021 -0.163 0.336 1.0000  
Leverage 0.341 0.006 0.063 0.106 0.254 1.0000 
 
Table 9 - Pearson’s correlation coefficients - Sample of Parent companies before Spin-Off 
VARIABLES Size 
Growth  
Opportunities 
Profitability 
Asset 
Tangibility 
NDTS Leverage 
Size 1.0000      
Growth Opp. -0.066 1.0000     
Profitability 0.474 -0.006 1.0000    
Asset 
Tangibility 
-0.099 -0.246 0.092 1.0000   
NDTS 0.331 -0.034 0.266 0.192 1.0000  
Leverage 0.399 -0.321 0.237 0.223 0.444 1.0000 
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Table 10 - VIF for the sample of Spun-off companies 
Independent Variable VIF 
Size 1.458 
Growth Opp. 1.082 
Profitability 1.342 
Asset Tangibility 1.173 
NDTS 1.2048 
 
Table 11 - VIF for the sample of Parent companies before Spin-off  
Independent Variable VIF 
Size 1.306 
Growth Opp. 1.047 
Profitability 1.331 
Asset Tangibility 1.160 
NDTS 1.243 
 
 
